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Abstract 
 
A detailed question set is required to test and measure the true extent that a 
software quality management system is adopted and implemented across a large 
company like AWE plc.  The analysis of the gathered data reveals specific topics 
of weakness that can also reflect the cultural acceptance or resistance that 
management groups have towards the adoption of quality systems.  Having 
identified detailed problems and barriers, effective strategies and programmes can 
be deployed to improve the level of implementation and, therefore, the 
effectiveness of a software quality management system.  This paper presents the 
question set used and the subsequent results obtained from the implementation 
assessment for 55 software systems at AWE plc.  The data is collated into 
management groups and the associated cultures discussed.  The topics of weakness 
are highlighted together with the very specific actions that are least undertaken.  A 
range of improvement actions is also presented. 
 
  
1. Introduction 
 
The two principal aims of this research paper are, firstly, to ascertain how well 
adopted and implemented the software quality management system is at AWE plc, 
and secondly, to gain an understanding of any problems or issues that were acting 
as a barrier to the implementation of the system.  The case study utilised data 
collated during 1999, from the implementation assessments of software systems 
across the company from many different managerial areas.  These areas and their 
associated software projects were responding to the requirement to meet the 
software quality management systems as defined in the Company Software 
Procedures.    
 
This research has been facilitated by the appointment of one of the authors1 to the 
position of Software Quality Manager at AWE plc and the motivating factor was to 
baseline current practice so that any improvement achieved from subsequent 
initiatives could be tracked and credit claimed.  The intent was to put in place 
improvement initiatives after gaining a good understanding of any problems and 
the reason for them.  The responsibilities of the position of Software Quality 
Manager include: maintaining the defined software quality management system; 
reviewing and approving the management plans of important, high risk, software 
products; maintaining a list (register) of known software items across the company; 
and ensuring implementation is regularly checked through audit or assessment.  
The data presented in this paper has been collated from undertaking these audits 
and assessments. 
 
The software quality management system at AWE plc had been an integral part of 
the company’s management system since 1991, and ISO 9001 certification was 
first successfully achieved in 1994.  The software quality management system had 
received a high degree of attention, highlighted by its explicit reference in the top-
level scope of the certification.  This high level of profile is consistent with the 
importance that software has in the research and development of nuclear weapons.  
Implementation of the software system would be considered mature as frequent 
assessment by the customer, the Ministry of Defence (MoD), has occurred every 
six months, over a subsequent five-year period.  Earlier research (Elliott et al, 
2005) had discovered some flaws in the way implementation had previously been 
checked, particularly in the internal audit process.  The use of audit deficiencies 
did not provide a useful tool in understanding the issues and problems associated 
with implementation. 
 
 
2. Background  
 
In 1950, The Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE), as it was known 
then, was originally under the management of the government department, The 
Ministry of Supply.  It was then transferred to the United Kingdom Atomic Energy 
Authority (UKAEA) in 1954, and subsequently in 1973, the establishment returned 
to Civil Service Management, under the Ministry of Defence (MoD) Procurement 
Executive.  In 1993, AWE became a government owned, contractor operated 
establishment and since then has been managed by two large contractor 
consortiums.  The assessments for this research were conducted during the first 
period of contractor management.  The site management and operations are still 
monitored at different levels by project teams from the MoD.  
 
Despite these managerial changes, the prominent organisational arrangements are 
very much functional line management oriented, with large numbers (hundreds) of 
staff grouped together to perform the main functional activities.  In many ways this 
has led to the perception that AWE is run by separate companies within one.  
Under the initial government owned, contractor operated arrangements the main 
core functional organisations were: a scientifically oriented research group (res) 
with highly qualified scientific personnel, a weapons or Systems Engineering 
group (weap) with the major concentration of highly qualified engineers, a 
production technology group (tech) which has a mix of qualified engineers and 
scientific staff, and the a site development group (inf) providing the site 
infrastructure and support with less qualified, but highly skilled engineering 
workforce.  Support activities are also provided by a smaller number of staff in 
support groups, namely, personnel (pers), financial (fin), and commercial (com).  
Safety, quality, and the security functions were amalgamated in an assurance group 
(sqs).  
 
A key organisational issue that had a significant impact on the software quality 
management system and the facilitation of this research is the appointment of local 
area software representatives (LASRs).  Each management area that manages 
software is required by the software quality management system to appoint a 
LASR to perform a number of software quality related duties.  A total of 70 
LASRs were appointed across the company, 35 of which were from areas that had 
significant software.  The other 35 were procurers of commercial off-the-shelf 
(COTS) software.  In these areas, the LASRs task was to keep a control of software 
use, by registering or recording an inventory of software licences and their 
respective owners.  In a software extensive area, a LASR was also required to 
approve the local software control plans (scp) and assignment of a risk category to 
each software item or product.  The software category defines the control activities 
required for its subsequent management.  There was no consistency to the type of 
people appointed as LASRs, which varied from administrative, scientific, engineer, 
developer or staff with other quality system roles.  This would have been due to the 
fact that the software quality system did not specify any skills or experience for the 
appointment.  
 
The company has a central Information Technology (IT) group that provides some 
in-house programming support and contract management to other groups as well as 
the IT network infrastructure, but there is no central software engineering support.  
AWE plc is well known for some world class software in such areas as weapon 
simulation, weapon effects, engineering design, system control and data acquisition 
and analysis.  
 
 
3. Literature Review   
 
This literature review covers two main themes; firstly, the problems organisations 
have with implementing their software quality systems on their software projects, 
and secondly, the key organisational cultural issues that exist that present a barrier 
to that implementation. 
 
Many standards exist to provide a framework for a software quality management 
system defining the organisational arrangements and the working processes.  The 
best known are the ISO 9001 standard (ISO, 2000) and the Software Engineering 
Institute’s (SEI) Capability Maturity Model (CMM) (Carnegie, 2000).   
 
The guidance (ISO, 2000) to the revision of the ISO 9001 standard from 1994 to 
2000 highlighted eight principles for a successful management system: customer 
focus, leadership, involvement of people, process approach, system approach to 
management, continual improvement, factual approach to decision making and 
mutually beneficial supplier relationships.  As the SEI CMM conveys five levels of 
maturity for a company to be world class, the initial key process areas to obtain the 
first level of maturity would be the most important.  These consist of: configuration 
management, quality assurance, sub-contract management, project tracking and 
oversight, project planning, and requirements management.  There is a correlation 
between these two standards, various management processes and requirements 
management, but there are also some differences, suggesting disagreement on what 
would be a magic formula for a software quality management system.  Further 
correlation of the importance of management processes and requirement 
management comes from the Standish Research Group’s Chaos Report (Standish, 
1994), which stated that the top eight reasons why projects are cancelled or 
severely fail to deliver on time, cost or performance, were: incomplete 
requirements, user involvement, lack of resources, unrealistic expectations, lack of 
senior management support, changing requirements, inadequate planning, system 
no longer needed.  Again, five relate to requirements management, and three to 
what would be considered general management processes.  The follow-up Standish 
Report (Standish, 2001) highlighted its top ten factors for project success as: 
executive support, user involvement, an experienced (project) manager, clear 
business objectives, minimized scope, standard infrastructure, firm basis 
requirements, formal methodology, reliable estimates, others, including: small 
milestones, proper planning, and competent staff and ownership.  Again there is 
some correlation, but there are also differences. 
 
Organisational culture does not feature highly in these standards or reports, 
although competency normally encompasses motivation (Spencer et al, 1992) 
along with knowledge and experience.  Motivation can be influenced by cultural 
factors (Wagner, 1999).  Indeed many excellent technical books on software 
quality management do not focus on culture, only occasionally referencing the 
issue.  Horch (1996) warns of the pitfalls, “starting a software quality programme 
is doomed to failure – inadequate preparation, misused terms, lack of planning, 
failure to recognise the individual role of members of the organisation are only a 
few pitfalls”.  This emphasises, yet again, the management issues and the 
involvement of staff.  Galin (2004) suggests that having colleagues involved in the 
development and, at least, the review of company procedures, will help convince 
other colleagues to abide to them.  However, this is known to be not totally 
successful and a further review to establish the need for local procedures may be 
necessary to gain full commitment to implementation.  The little attention to 
culture is perhaps surprising, indicating that the effect of culture on the adoption 
and implementation of a software quality management system has been under-
estimated (Siaksa, 2004).  This situation may be further complicated in a multi-
national company (Siaksa, 2004).  Indeed, the style of management (Parzinger, 
2001) also has a significant impact on culture  
 
Despite this lack of emphasis on cultural issues for quality management adoption 
and recognition of its impact has been researched and made available.  Crosby 
(1997) was an early pioneer who noticed coherent patterns of culture impacting on 
technology processes.  Radice et al (1984) adapted Crosby’s “stratification by 
quality” scheme to software development.  Later Humphrey (1989), of the SEI, 
extended their work and identified five levels of process maturity through which a 
software development organisation might grow.  A human resource maturity model 
was then proposed by Curtis (1990).  These models represent points of view of the 
same phenomenon.  Crosby named his patterns on management attitude, 
Humphrey, by type of process and Curtis, on the treatment of people.  An 
interesting concept of cultural definitions, developed by Weinberg (1993) has been 
collated with the work of Crosby, Curtis, and Humphrey to indicate both cultural 
and process improvement or maturity as conveyed in Table 1.  However, Weinberg 
warns that maturity may not be the right word, as any software culture can be 
successful.  Indeed, moving from one cultural pattern, as Weinberg prefers, may 
not be right for certain organisations.  
 
Table 1.  Weinberg’s (1993) combined cultural and process improvement 
maturity scale. 
No Culture type Crosby Humphrey Curtis 
5. Congruent  Certainty Optimizing Optimized 
4. Anticipating  Wisdom  Managed Institutionalized 
3. Steering  Enlightenment Defined Tailored 
2. Routine  Awakening Repeatable Managed  
1. Variable  Uncertainty Initial Herded 
0. Oblivious  None specified None specified None specified 
 
 
4. Methodology 
 
To meet the objectives of this research, a measurement system was devised to 
check and assess the adoption and level of implementation of the software quality 
management system, and also provide a means to gather information on specific 
topics so that problem areas could be identified.  The assessments were then 
conducted, primarily as part of the 1999 internal audit programme, but also in an 
ad-hoc fashion when some guidance or clarification on the software quality 
management system was requested.  As the assessments were conducted, any 
comments that related to general feelings towards the software quality management 
system, the role of a LASR, and any attitudes towards being assessed, were 
recorded.  This led to an impromptu survey on the LASRs as to their understanding 
and motivation about their position and duties.  Three basic questions were asked; 
(1) Did they know what to do?  (2) Did they know how to do it?  (3) Did they want 
to do the job?  They were then asked if they would like some or further training for 
the role.  The assessment data was then collated by topic area and by main 
functional group to see if there were specific improvement opportunities or cultural 
issues that needed addressing.  
 
 
5. The Measurement System 
 
The measurement system devised to capture the true level of implementation of the 
software quality management system was known as an implementation rating.  The 
system was a checklist of specific questions covering the entire software quality 
management arrangements and was divided into topics.  Each topic has a series of 
questions relating to implementation tasks and graded 0-4, as shown in Table 2.  
The first four levels, 0-3, are a hierarchy of compliance, and the last, level 4, 
known as “established” relates to the maintenance of the systems and in particular 
the documentation.  Most of the data was gathered as part of the Company audit 
programme.  It is a well known observation that prior to an audit, the area to be 
audited will suddenly make an effort to put in place many of the requirements they 
are to be audited on.  Many auditors find the appropriate documents requested have 
often just been published with “the ink still wet.”  Clearly these are immature 
systems and not normal practice.  It is therefore quite likely that these newly 
created documents will not be maintained.  So the “level established” is a check for 
evidence that the defined local arrangements have been in place for a while, have 
been used and updated for changes, are adding value and provide a true reflection 
of actual practice. 
 
Table 2.  The defined levels of the implementation rating. 
 
Level Heading Criteria and Description 
0. No evidence Unaware of requirement, no documentary evidence of implementation available 
1. Some 
Evidence 
Aware of requirement, some historical evidence available, less than half the 
implementation requirements for that topic have been met. 
2. Reasonable Evidence of historical implementation, may not be up to date, more than half but 
not all the implementation requirements for that topic have been met. 
3. Compliant System fully implemented, all requirements met, but may be immature 
4. Established Has been reviewed and subsequently updated, in place for something like a year 
and is now institutionalised 
 
 
The subject areas in which the company software quality management system was 
divided are listed in Table 3.  These subject areas were chosen on the basis of 
importance.  Although a topic area such as the categorisation system did not 
contain many implementation requirements, the decision on this category does, as 
it assigns the subsequent required control activities.  
 
Table 3.  Subject areas of the software quality management system assessed 
by the implementation rating. 
 
Software Quality Topic Explanation 
Organisational responsibility (org)  LASR appointed with responsibilities in job description 
Software Register (reg) All software systems recorded with baseline data 
Categorisation (cat) Level of importance assessed management life cycle 
defined 
Management Plan (scp) Management and control arrangements defined in a plan 
Specification (spec) User and software requirements specifications 
Design, development & coding (des) Design information and applied coding standard 
Reviews & Verification (r&v) Life cycle stage outputs reviewed and verified 
Testing & validation (t&v) Test plan, specification procedures, records arrangements 
Configuration Management (scm) Identification of items & baselines, change control, status 
accounting, audits 
Disaster Recovery (d.r.) Data & system back-ups and recovery plan 
Computer Services (c.s.) Service plan, measures, configuration management 
Procurement (proc) Specification, contract controls and testing arrangements 
 
 
6. Results 
 
Tables 4 to 11 are the results of the software quality management system 
assessments conducted in 1999.  Each table represents the data collated by each of 
the main organisational functional groups.  For each system assessed the level 
achieved against the implementation rating (Table 2) was assigned as that value for 
each software quality topic (Table 3).  The totals for that topic and the average 
value are presented for each topic.  The overall total value and the maximum 
achievable are also presented so that the functional area percentage implementation 
can be recorded and these are collated in Table 12 together with the overall 
Company average.  Table 13 presents the overall Company average for each 
software quality topic to indicate the strengths and weaknesses of implementation 
areas.  The tasks that are the least undertaken for each software quality topic are 
contained in Table 14.  The Local Area Software Representatives (LASRs) survey 
on how well they knew their roles and how they felt about it are conveyed in Table 
15.  Table 16 is a list of the types of comments received when conducting the 
assessments on the implementation of the software quality management system. 
 
Table 4. Assessment results of nine software systems in assurance (sqs) 
 
System org reg cat scp spec des r&v t&v scm d.r. c.s. proc Total Max %imp 
SQS1 2 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 16 48 33.3% 
SQS2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 0 n/a 2 15 44 34.1% 
SQS3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 0 n/a 2 13 44 29.5% 
SQS4 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 n/a 1 14 44 31.8% 
SQS5 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 0 1 n/a 1 14 44 31.8% 
SQS6 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 n/a 1 13 44 29.5% 
SQS7 0 1 1 1 0 n/a 1 1 1 1 n/a n/a 7 36 19.4% 
SQS8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 n/a 1 10 44 22.7% 
SQS9 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 n/a n/a 10 40 25.0% 
Totals 15 14 12 13 7 7 8 12 5 9 1 9 112 388  
Average 1.67 1.56 1.3 1.44 0.78 0.88 0.9 1.33 0.56 1 1 1.29   28.9% 
 
 
Table 5.  Assessment results of two software systems in commercial (com) 
 
System org reg cat scp spec des r&v t&v scm d.r. c.s. proc Total Max %imp 
C1 1 1 3 1 1 n/a 1 1 0 2 n/a 3 14 40 35.0% 
C2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 n/a n/a 8 40 20.0% 
Totals 2 2 4 2 1 0 1 2 1 4  3 22 80  
Average 1 1 2 1 0.5 0 0.5 1 0.5 2   3   27.5% 
 
 
Table 6.  Assessment results of nine software systems in infrastructure (inf) 
 
System org reg cat scp spec des r&v t&v scm d.r. c.s. proc Total Max %imp 
INF1 3 2 3 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 n/a n/a 17 40 42.5% 
INF2 3 2 3 3 2 1 1 2 2 2 n/a 2 23 44 52.3% 
INF3 3 2 3 3 2 1 1 2 2 2 n/a n/a 21 40 52.5% 
INF4 2 2 3 2 1 1 1 2 0 2 n/a n/a 16 40 40.0% 
INF5 2 2 4 3 2 1 1 2 1 2 n/a 1 21 44 47.7% 
INF6 2 2 4 3 2 1 1 2 1 2 n/a 1 21 44 47.7% 
INF7 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 n/a 1 15 44 34.1% 
INF8 2 2 3 2 1 1 0 1 1 2 n/a n/a 15 40 37.5% 
INF9 2 2 3 2 1 1 0 1 1 2 n/a n/a 15 40 37.5% 
Totals 21 17 28 22 13 9 7 15 10 17  5 164 376  
Average 2.33 1.89 3.11 2.44 1.44 1 0.8 1.67 1.11 1.89  1.25   43.6% 
 
 
Table 7.  Assessment results of four software systems in finance (fin) 
 
System org reg cat scp spec des r&v t&v scm d.r. c.s. proc Total Max %imp 
F1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 2 13 48 27.1% 
F2 1 1 1 1 1 n/a 0 2 0 1 n/a 1 9 40 22.5% 
F3 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 3 1 2 n/a 1 13 44 29.5% 
F4 1 1 1 1 1 n/a 1 2 0 2 n/a 1 11 40 27.5% 
Totals 4 4 4 4 4 1 2 9 2 6 1 5 46 172  
Average 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.5 2.25 0.5 1.5 1 1.25   26.7% 
 
 
Table 8.  Assessment results of two software systems in personnel (pers) 
 
System org reg cat scp spec des r&v t&v scm d.r. c.s. proc Total Max %imp 
P1 3 1 1 1 0 n/a 0 1 0 2 n/a 1 10 40 25.0% 
P2 3 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 n/a 0 11 44 25.0% 
Totals 6 3 2 2 1 0 0 2 1 3   1 21 84  
Average 3 1.5 1 1 0.5 0 0 1 0.5 1.5   0.5   25% 
 
 
 
Table 9.  Assessment results of eleven software systems in technology (tech) 
 
System org reg cat scp spec des r&v t&v scm d.r. c.s. proc Total Max %imp 
T1 3 2 3 2 1 n/a 1 2 1 2 n/a 2 19 40 47.5% 
T2 3 2 3 2 1 0 0 2 1 2 n/a n/a 16 40 40.0% 
T3 2 1 2 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 n/a 1 11 44 25.0% 
T4 3 1 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 2 n/a n/a 19 40 47.5% 
T5 3 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 2 n/a 1 15 44 34.1% 
T6 3 1 3 2 0 0 0 1 1 2 n/a n/a 13 40 32.5% 
T7 3 1 2 2 0 0 0 2 1 2 n/a n/a 13 40 32.5% 
T8 2 2 3 3 1 n/a 0 2 0 2 n/a 2 17 40 42.5% 
T9 2 1 2 2 1 n/a 1 1 0 1 n/a n/a 11 36 30.6% 
T10 3 1 3 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 19 48 39.6% 
T11 4 4 4 2 1 n/a 1 2 1 2 n/a 1 22 40 55.0% 
Totals 31 17 30 25 10 4 6 17 8 18 1 8 175 452  
average 2.82 1.55 2.72 2.27 0.91 0.57 0.5 1.55 0.73 1.64 1 1.33   38.7% 
 
 
Table 10.  Assessment results of nine software systems in weapons (weap) 
 
System org reg cat scp spec des r&v t&v scm d.r. c.s. proc Total Max %imp 
W1 2 4 3 4 3 2 3 3 2 2 n/a n/a 28 40 70.0% 
W2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 n/a n/a 21 40 52.5% 
W3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n/a 0 0 44 0.0% 
W4 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 0 n/a n/a 28 40 70.0% 
W5 3 3 4 3 3 3 2 3 2 0 n/a n/a 26 40 65.0% 
W6 2 2 4 3 2 0 2 2 2 0 n/a 2 21 44 47.7% 
W7 2 2 4 3 2 0 2 2 1 0 n/a 1 19 44 43.2% 
W8 2 1 2 2 1 0 2 2 1 1 n/a 1 15 44 34.1% 
W9 4 3 2 4 4 n/a 2 4 1 2 n/a n/a 26 36 72.2% 
Totals 20 21 25 24 20 10 18 22 13 7   4 184 372  
Average 2.22 2.33 2.77 2.67 2.22 1.25 2 2.44 1.44 0.78   1   49.5% 
 
 
Table 11.  Assessment results of nine software systems in scientific research 
(res) 
 
System org reg cat scp spec des r&v t&v scm d.r. c.s. proc Total Max %imp 
R1 3 2 2 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 n/a n/a 18 40 45.0% 
R2 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 n/a n/a 9 40 22.5% 
R3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 3 2 2 n/a n/a 18 40 45.0% 
R4 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 2 0 1 n/a 1 10 44 22.7% 
R5 2 1 1 1 0 n/a 0 1 1 1 n/a n/a 8 36 22.2% 
R6 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 n/a n/a 14 40 35.0% 
R7 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 n/a 1 15 44 34.1% 
R8 3 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 n/a 15 44 34.1% 
R9 3 2 3 3 2 0 0 1 0 1 n/a n/a 15 40 37.5% 
Totals 20 15 17 15 10 5 5 14 8 10 1 2 122 368  
average 2.22 1.67 1.88 1.67 1.11 0.63 0.6 1.56 0.89 1.11 1 1   33.1% 
 
 
Table 12.  Average assessment results for each of the functional groups 
 
Group sqs com inf fin pers tech weap res Company 
Average %  
implementing 
rating 
28.7 27.5 43.62 26.74 25 38.72 49.46 33.15 34.1% 
 
Table 13.  Average assessment results for each topic across the Company 
 
Topic org reg cat scp spec des r&v t&v scm d.r. c.s. proc 
Ave Co 
Imp rate 
2.03 1.56 1.98 1.69 1.06 0.6 0.72 1.6 0.78 1.43 1 1.33 
 
 
Table 14.  Activity least undertaken for each topic heading. 
 
Software Quality Topic Main Problem 
Organisational Responsibility (org)  No evidence of a local review for the need of local 
procedures, or check of implementation. 
Software Register (reg) Local registers do not contain all required entries 
Categorisation (cat) Under categorisation of software items and no evidence of 
categorisation review 
Management Plan (scp) Not all required topics covered in the plan, and the quality of 
the information was generally lower than accepted 
Specification (spec) Incomplete and out of date specifications  
Design, Development & 
Implementation (des) 
No review of system design characteristics and the 
appropriate life-cycle to follow 
Reviews &Verification  (r&v) Very little evidence of review activity 
Testing & Validation (t&v) Test plans are generally not maintained, and poor traceability 
of test records to software previous versions 
Configuration Management (scm) Little planning and development of baselines, status of CIs 
not captured or maintained, no CM audits 
Disaster Recovery (d.r.) Insufficient testing of the recovery plan 
Computer Services (c.s.) No monitoring and poor maintenance of service plans 
Procurement (proc) Little evidence of the review of requirements 
 
 
Table 15.  LASR survey results out of 70 people questioned 
 
Knew the totality of the 
responsibilities 
Knew how to perform in 
the role 
Wanted the 
appointment 
Wanted 
training 
19 9 23 33 
 
 
Table 16.  List and frequency of comments made during assessments 
 
 
Comment 
Support  
Groups 
(com, sqs, fin, 
pers) 
Research 
Group 
(res) 
Other main 
Groups 
(tech, inf, weap) 
It’s not clear what the requirements are Often Often Occasionally 
We need to read and understand all of the 
procedures before we now what to do 
Occasionally Often Occasionally 
Don’t understand terminology Often Often Rarely 
I can’t visualise what needs to be done,  Often Occasionally Rarely 
can’t you provide a diagram? 
It’s not what we do Rarely Often Rarely 
It’s bureaucratic Often Often Occasionally 
That’s not our responsibility Often Occasionally Rarely 
We’re just not doing it Occasionally Occasionally Never 
Who are you to tell me how to do my job? Never Occasionally Never 
 
 
 
7. Analysis of results 
 
The assessment sample of 55 systems is sufficient to provide a high degree of 
confidence in the interpretation of the results.  It was rare to record a zero rating for 
a software quality topic for each system assessed, which demonstrates that nearly 
all areas visited had made some attempt to comply.  The low occurrence of rating 
values of three, to indicate full compliance, signifies a lack of drive by local 
management to achieve full implementation of the software quality management 
system, and there was certainly an absence of any systematic check.  Of further 
concern is that the benefits of implementation are not being sustained as the 
compliance evidence of software quality activities is being poorly maintained, as 
indicated by the even fewer number of level four ratings. Documents or outputs 
from activities are at times not being referred to, used or updated when changes 
occur. Initial implementation to achieve compliance is neither being established 
nor institutionalised. 
 
The assurance group (sqs) results from Table 4 show that the organisational 
arrangements attracted the highest scores on the implementation rating.  Within 
this topic, the actions of appointing of local areas software representatives 
(LASRs) with appropriate job descriptions were generally undertaken well.  All 
LASRs had set-up a local register but their lack of understanding of configuration 
management techniques meant that these listings were of limited value.  With only 
one level three and no level fours recorded across all systems a complete lack of 
systematic checking of compliance was evident.   
 
As the commercial group (com) only owned two software systems, as documented 
in Table 5, it would be difficult draw definitive conclusions.  As procurement is a 
main function of this group, it is not too surprising the one system scored well in 
this area for software.  Knowledge on the need to back-up data in case of a disaster 
was evident by the higher scores on this subject.   
 
Table 6 shows the infrastructure group (inf) achieved higher scores on the 
assignment of the correct category for software systems.  It became apparent 
during the assessments that a number of meetings had been arranged to agree the 
category assignments and this was an area where two level fours were attributed.  
Unfortunately, the conducting of reviews for other life cycle activities did not score 
highly.  The production of control plans scored well.   
 
The financial group (fin) scored highest on testing and validation (t&v) as can be 
seen from Table 7.  This is in keeping with this groups affinity to get the numbers 
right.  A lack of technical knowledge resulted in low levels being recorded on most 
other subjects.    
 
Predictably the personnel group (pers) scores in Table 8 were highest for the 
organisational arrangements which include appointment of LASRs and sign-up to 
job descriptions.  During the assessments it became evident that they had relied on 
the Information Technology department to provide most of their software quality 
documentation.   Unfortunately this re-assignment of responsibility had not been 
documented in local service level agreements which accounted for some of their 
low scores.   
 
The eleven systems assessed in the technology area (tech) provided the biggest 
variance of results.  Total absence of specification and review records, together 
with a lack of design were the main problems areas, as can be seen in Table 9.  The 
appointment of LASRs had been completed well and the production of control 
plans was reasonable.  The categorisation system was also quite well understood.  
The poor use of registers and the configuration management process present a clear 
training need in this area.   
 
The highest system assessments were recorded in the weapons group (weap) as 
shown in Table 10.  Unfortunately the lack of knowledge and ownership of one 
software system recorded a complete zero result.  This highlights the stringent 
audit process that requires documentary evidence “at the time of audit”.  The main 
concern for this group was the significant risk associated with the loss of data, that 
should have been documented in disaster recovery plans.  This had been 
completely overlooked on many of their systems.  However, this was an 
organisational group where the maintenance of the quality system was known to be 
good and seen to add value as emphasised by the number of fours recorded.   
 
The research group (res) has some very large and complex software and the need 
for design information was a hot topic of debate, which Table 11 shows had a low 
score.  Risk factors associated with staff turn-over and the learning time needed to 
understand complex software were considered in the discussion on reliability and 
maintainability.  The skill and ability of some scientists to understand complex 
structures was astounding as was the motivation to develop software to advance 
scientific knowledge.  These attributes compensate to some degree for their lack of 
software engineering knowledge.  
 
As can be seen from Table 12, an overall company performance implementation 
result of 34.1% has been achieved for the software quality management system.  
The result could be considered low, which raises questions as to why the 
certification to ISO 9001 had not identified the problem, and why had it never been 
raised by the subsequent continued assessments or the internal audit process.  This 
low score can, in-part, be explained by the method of gathering the information.  
The audit process requires evidence, mostly documentary, that the various 
processes required actually took place.  If this is not available, or is insufficient, the 
assessed score will be low.  So good practice may well have taken place, however, 
it was clearly not the best practice as the required proof was not retained as 
evidence.  This provides an example of Weinberg’s (1993) relativity of quality, 
quality to the auditor is shown by good documentation, whereas quality to a 
software developer is represented by good functional programs. 
 
A list of the strongest and weakest topics, as assessed and averaged out across the 
whole Company, can be seen in Table 13. The weakest implemented topics, 
together with the list of least undertaken activities in Table 14, provides a succinct 
training needs analysis, highlighting the topics requiring significant education and 
supporting guidance documentation. 
 
The group comments recorded in Table 16 have identified a significant relationship 
between culture and resistance to implementation: the more frequent and critical 
the comments, the lower the level of implementation.  This is corroborated by the 
finding that the supporting areas (sqs, com, fin, pers), which are more critical of the 
system and have lower scores then the main production groups (weap, inf, tech, 
res).  Culture is created by personalities that have been influenced by their 
interests, training, knowledge and experiences (Spencer et al, 1992).  There is an 
indication of an unwillingness to comply in these support groups, as shown by their 
comments.  A key theme is their expectation or hope that other groups, the 
Information Technology department or sub contractor, will do the quality 
assurance for them.  Any verbal agreements were not documented and sometimes 
not actually agreed.  
 
The science and research group (res) has been singled out in the comments list in 
Table 16, because of the slightly different type of comments they provided.  Of 
particular interest is the occasional recording of “Who are you to tell me how to do 
my job?”  This conveys a degree of animosity, which will adversely influence their 
willingness to comply and does explain the groups placing at the bottom of the 
main functional group list.     
 
Many of the software systems being assessed in this science and research group 
were providing and supporting leading edge science and technology.  The software 
developers were themselves, highly qualified research scientists.  However, they 
would not, in general, have had any formal training in software engineering, and 
the terminology of the software quality management system was not well 
understood.  Indeed the term “engineering” applied to their work was not 
welcomed.  They would, in general, be the users and the developers of the 
software.  In this respect, the quality goal of customer or user satisfaction is dealt 
with, as it is an obvious personal desire.  The requirements are also well known, as 
the functions to be programmed are science based and are less likely to be 
misinterpreted.  Motivation to be productive is also likely to be high, as it supports 
an interest and desire to advance science.  The risks presented are not realised until 
a scientist moves on or leaves the company.  Then the detailed requirements and 
the design of the software are lost, because it has not been documented.  The 
potential benefits of the quality system are then not realised. 
 
In contrast, the weapons group was far more willing to accept quality assurance 
(QA) as an integral part of their job.  In general, there was a good understanding of 
what was required and there were no problems with terminology.  This group had a 
high number of qualified software engineers.  Similarly, the infrastructure group 
demonstrated a high degree of willingness to achieve compliance but not always a 
fully understanding what was required.  The technology group (tech) has a mixture 
of both scientific research and engineering staff so, from the analysis of the impact 
of cultural influence made so far, its position in the implementation hierarchy 
between the infrastructure group and the science research group is not too 
surprising. 
 
 
8. Discussion on ISO 9001 certification 
 
The overall assessment result leads to the question of what implementation level 
the software quality management system is actually required to achieve ISO 
certification.  This question is, in fact, unfair because a level is not obtained as part 
of the assessment.  The assessment process consists of two main elements, a 
review of the documented management system to ensure it meets the ISO 9001 
standard’s clauses, followed by a site visit to assess implementation.  During the 
checking of implementation, the auditors will review the documented practice to 
that actually performed, and if there are discrepancies, issues will be raised.  These 
issues are generally graded in terms of severity of deviation from the intended 
practice.  These grades or criteria will be documented within the third-party’s own 
certification procedures.  An example would be:  
• an observation - for a slight discrepancy,  
• a minor non-conformity - when a standard clause is not fully met, 
• a major non-conformance - when a standard clause requirement is not 
complied with, or a significant number of related minor non-conformities have 
been found.   
The initial certification depends on not receiving a major non-conformity during 
the site visit.  If one or more have been received, certification is deferred until they 
have been addressed.  This requires a follow-up site assessment, three months later, 
to ensure the appropriate corrective action has taken place.  So, although a 
significant amount of compliance is needed, the actual “pass” for certification 
could depend on the way the company deals with specific corrective action.  A 
similar, but slightly more relaxed situation exists after the initial certification, with 
continued assessments.  These normally occur at six monthly intervals.  In these 
circumstances, when a major non-conformity is found, a three-month period of 
grace is allowed before certification is removed.  Again this presents a crisis 
management situation with specific actions to be addressed.  This point was raised 
with one-third party ISO 9001 auditor, with 17 years auditing experience.  The 
answer to the specific question of how many companies was he aware of, that had 
failed a third party ISO 9001 assessment, was none.  Only one company had failed 
at the documentation review stage of the ISO 9001 certification process. 
 
Also of consideration is the depth of audit concept (Elliott et al, 2005).  This 
suggests that there is a reduced likelihood of an issue being raised, or certainly a 
major issue being raised, if a number of system elements, which may be 
administrative in nature, are in-place at the start of the audit trail.  In this respect a 
typical audit trail for the site assessment of the software quality management 
system consists of: 
1. a review of the company software quality management system 
documentation.  
2. an assessment of responsibilities of a company point of contact, the 
software quality manager, who can demonstrate:  
• where software is in the company, the register of registers,  
• that high risk management plans are independently approved,  
• that the software quality management system has been audited.  
3. the assignment of a point of contact for each management area with: 
• an inventory, the register, of software in that area,  
• a control plan to demonstrate how the software is managed in that 
area.    
This presents a scenario of a significant amount of audit checking, for 
administrative type activities, before the “quality” of implementation is assessed in 
a local area.   
 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
There are a number of highly significant conclusions that can be made from this 
research, indicating a successful achievement of the objectives.  The overall 
implementation level of the software quality management system was felt to be too 
low, and this has led to the provision of support for improvement initiatives.  The 
collation of results by main functional groups provides clarity of where support is 
most needed.  The results facilitated an investigation into why the internal audit 
process (Elliott et al, 2005) had not previously identified the low level of 
implementation.  It also questioned the role of ISO certification, in view of the fact 
that AWE plc has a valid reputation for producing world class software and is at 
the forefront of science and technology.  This validates Weinberg’s assertion 
(Weinberg, 1993) that any software culture can be considered successful.  Of 
concern, but of less profile, is that the compliance element of what is implemented 
is not considered to be valuable enough to be maintained properly, as demonstrated 
by the sparseness of the ‘institutionalised’ implementation rating of four.  This 
indicates a lack of drive and attention to detail to achieve it.  
 
The results do show a commitment to achieve implementation and that there are 
some well established elements of the software quality management system: the 
appointment of a LASR, the register, the categorisation system and the main 
management plan.  However, it is the actual quality of the implemented system that 
needs to be improved.   
 
Comments received during the assessment clearly indicate that cultural resistance 
has had a significant impact on adoption and subsequent implementation.  Culture 
is often deep seated, and this will be quite a difficult problem to overcome.  Some 
of this resentment emerged as a consequence of the original initiative to meet the 
first ISO 9001 certification in 1994.  Indeed there was, at times, a resentment of the 
audit assessments as well, typified by the frequent comment, “Who are you to tell 
me how to do my job”. 
 
 
The reasons for the low level of performance can be summarised as a lack of 
understanding and the resulting cultural barriers.  Training needs can be 
ascertained from the lowest scoring topics in Table 13 and the least undertaken 
tasks in Table 14.  These are: requirements management, development and use of 
design, how to conduct reviews and software configuration management.  Learning 
will be sustained with the provision of guidance documentation on these topics.  
The maintenance of documentation is a major issue and this is due, in part, to the 
lack of understanding of configuration management.  When changes occur, many 
baseline documents are not up-dated, because they do not form part of a baseline 
listing, so the impact analysis of the change is incomplete.  The appointment of 
people to the role of LASR has not been totally effective as indicated by the 
responses to the questions in Table 15.  If someone is not happy with being 
appointed to such a position, they are unlikely to perform it well. 
 
There is correlation between these issues found at AWE plc to those highlighted in 
the reports and standards in the literature review.  The weapons group (weap) and 
the infrastructure group (inf) fit  Weinberg’s (1993) “steering” culture view that 
they are dealing with their quality problems, whereas the science research group  
(res) exhibit some of the behaviours of the “oblivious” culture in that they are 
sometimes unaware they are performing software development, but also the super 
programmer element of the “routine” culture.  Finally all support groups (sqs, fin, 
com, pers) can be at the “oblivious” and “variable” levels, if they know they have 
quality problems, but they do not know why.   
 
Training to improve understanding is the key improvement action due to the 
prolific developer and user role, particularly in the science research area.  
Conveying the principles of software engineering and how they relate and how 
they can improve current working practices, should be the focus of this training.  
There is also a need to provide some training for senior management to convince 
them of the benefits of a software quality management system and to facilitate the 
drive and the much-needed systematic checks.   
 
 
10. Recommendations and further research 
 
An important conclusion that can be drawn from this research is that the system 
needs to be reviewed and revised to provide a clearer message as to what is 
required.  In this revision, extensive consultation is needed to address the 
ownership issue.  Any revision should retain the well-established system elements, 
such as registers, LASRs, a categorisation system and a local management plan.  
There are similarities between identifying configuration baselines and an inventory 
listing so these should be integrated in change control procedures, i.e. the register 
should capture the entire baseline and then be used to identify the configuration 
items that are impacted by that change.  Training in configuration management and 
conducting reviews, particularly design reviews, are key areas for improvement.  A 
competency framework for the various roles for software management, such as 
Manager, User or Developer, should be devised with suitable training programmes.  
The support groups need to become knowledgeable customers and research 
scientists need help to understand the principles of software engineering and how 
the system can provide benefits.  It may be useful to develop a self-assessment 
version of the checklist, to possibly facilitate local management review and audit, 
which again will help with the ownership and the systematic checking issues.  It 
would also be of interest to carry out research to learn from other companies failing 
ISO Certification and the reasons why, but it may prove difficult to obtain the data. 
 
The implementation rating measurement system has demonstrated that it is an 
excellent gap analysis tool and it has identified the specific technical issues that 
need to be addressed to improve implementation.  The results and comments 
gathered during assessments also identify a relationship between the level of 
achievement and cultural resistance to the software quality management system.  
This paper has shown that the cultural aspects need to be understood in developing 
an effective strategy for improvement.  
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